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Introduction
Max Weber began his sociology of law with a description of the then present of Western 
legal thought, along with a brief summary of its previous stages.  This  appreciation begins with a 
summary description of the Western legal thought of Weber=s time, as it looks from our present 
100 years later, emphasizing the contrast between the mainstream of his time, now called 
Classical Legal Thought, and its critics in the Asocial current.@  Part II presents Weber=s sociology 
2of law, comparing and contrasting his approach with that of the social current.  The most striking 
thing about Weber=s sociology of law, from the perspective of legal theory a century after he 
wrote, is his ambivalent endorsement of legal formalism.  This entailed rejection of the social 
current=s critique, a critique that is close to universally accepted today.  In Part III, I explain 
Weber=s attitude toward legal formalism as motivated by the internal requirements of his theory 
of domination, in which, after the demise of all earlier modes of legitimation, the Iron Cage of 
modernity is held together by bureaucrats defined by their adherence to that mode of legal 
reasoning.   Part IV argues that Weber=s approach was inconsistent with the irrationalist and 
decisionist strands in his own theory of modernity, a theory that helps in understanding the 
current situation of legal thought, if we take the un-Weberian step of applying it to legal 
formalism.  Finally, Part V offers an interpretation of the contemporary mode of legal thought as 
an episode in the sequences of disenchantment and reenchantment suggested by Weber=s 
philosophy of history, and uses Weberian elements to construct a distinct contemporary ideal 
type of legal thought. The very brief conclusion suggests the strong affiliation between Weber 
(read as above) and one of the sects of modern legal theory, namely critical legal studies.
Part I. Western legal thought in 1900
Weber produced his sociology of law at a moment of dramatic transition in Western legal 
thought.  In 1900, there was a well defined mainstream mode, which we now customarily call 
Classical Legal Thought (CLT) and two challengers: what I will call the Asocial current,@ or 
3Asocially oriented legal thought,@ and Marxist legal thought.  This Part presents the classical and 
social modes.  Weber=s sociology presents CLT as the mode of the present.  His analysis of CLT 
is heavily indebted to the socially oriented critics who developed a rather elaborate picture of 
their classical opponents, a picture that remains at least largely plausible to this day.  But, as we 
will see in Part II, Weber had his own distinctive critique of CLT, and also a critique of the 
social.
A. Classical Legal Thought
According to its social critics, according to Weber, and according to most (not all) of 
today=s historians, the late 19th century mainstream saw law as having a strong internal structural 
coherence based on the three traits of exhaustive elaboration of the distinction between private 
and public law,  Aindividualism,@ and commitment to legal interpretive formalism.  These traits 
combined in Athe will theory.@1
In the social jurists= version, the will theory was that the private law rules of the 
Aadvanced@ Western nation states were well understood as a set of rational derivations from the 
notion that government should help individuals realize their wills, restrained only as necessary to 
permit others to do the same.  In its more ambitious versions, the will theory made public as well 
as private law norms follow from this foundational commitment (for example, by generating 
theories of the separation of powers from the nature of rights). 
The will theory was an attempt to identify the rules that should follow from consensus in 
favor of the goal of individual self-realization.  It was not a political or moral philosophy 
justifying this goal; nor was it a positive historical or sociological theory about how this had 
4come to be the goal.  Rather, the theory offered a specific, will based and deductive interpretation 
of the interrelationship of the dozens or hundreds of relatively concrete norms of the extant 
national legal orders, and of the legislative and adjudicative institutions that generated and 
applied the norms.
AOutside@ or Aabove@ legal theory, there were a variety of rationales for the legal 
commitment to individualism thus understood.  Of these, only natural rights theory was also 
highly relevant on the Ainside,@ that is, in the development of the technique of legal analysis 
based on deduction.  Natural rights theorists had elaborated the will theory, beginning in the 17th 
century, as a set of implications from their normative premises, and their specific legal technique 
was the direct ancestor of the legal formalism that the socially oriented reformers were to attack 
in its positivized form.
In the 19th century, the German historical school (Savigny) developed a positivist version 
of normative formalism.  National systems of law reflect as a matter of fact the normative order 
of the underlying society;  such a normative order is coherent or tends toward coherence on the 
basis of the spirit and history of the people in question; Alegal scientists@ can and should elaborate 
the positive legal rules composing the system on the premise of its internal coherence.  In the late 
19th century, the German pandectists (Windschied, Puchta) worked at the analysis of the basic 
conceptions of the German common law version of Roman law with the aim of establishing that 
this particular system could be made internally coherent, and also be made to approach 
gaplessness.   Many Continental legal scholars understood the German Civil Code of 1900 as the 
legislative adoption of this system.
In France, Britain and the United States, the historical school was a minor tendency, but 
5the same conception of a will theory combining individualism and deductive form gradually 
supplanted earlier ways of understanding private and, in the United States, public law.  The 
normative or Aoutside@ force for the theory might come from utilitarianism, or from Lockean or 
Kantian or French revolutionary natural rights, or from a variant of evolutionism (the movement 
of the progressive societies has been from contract to status; social Darwinism).  But however 
derived, normative individualism was closely connected with logical method in the constitution 
of some version of the will theory.
The will theory in turn served a variety of purposes within legal discourse.  It guided the 
scholarly reconceptualization, reorganization and reform of private law rules, in what the 
participants understood as an apolitical rationalization project. But it also provided the discursive 
framework for the decision of hundreds or perhaps thousands of cases, throughout the 
industrializing West, in which labor confronted capital and small business confronted big 
business.  And it provided an abstract, overarching ideological formulation of the meaning of the 
rule of law as an essential element in a Liberal legal order.
B. The Asocial@ as a mode of legal thought
 The inventors of the social include Jhering, Ehrlich, Gierke, Geny, Saleilles, Duguit, 
Lambert, Josserand, Gounod, Gurvitch, Pound and Cardozo.2  They had in common with the 
Marxists that they interpreted the actual regime of the will theory as an epiphenomenon in 
relation to a Abase,@ in the case of the Marxists,  the capitalist economy and in the case of the 
social, Asociety@ conceived as an organism.  The idea of both was that the will theory in some 
sense Asuited@ the socio-economic conditions of the first half of the 19th century.  But the social 
6people were anti-Marxist, just as much as they were anti-laissez faire.  Their goal was to save 
Liberalism from itself.
Their basic idea was that the conditions of late 19th century life represented a social 
transformation, consisting of urbanization, industrialization, organizational society, globalization 
of markets, all summarized in the idea of Ainterdependence.@  Because the will theory was 
individualist, it ignored interdependence, and endorsed particular legal rules that permitted anti-
social behavior of many kinds.  The crises of the modern factory (industrial accidents) and the 
urban slum (pauperization), and later the crisis of the financial markets, all derived from the 
failure of coherently individualist law to respond to the coherently social needs of modern 
conditions of interdependence. 
 From this Ais@ analysis, they derived the Aought@ of a reform program, one that was 
astonishingly successful, and globalized even more effectively than classical legal thought, 
through many of the same mechanisms, but also because the social became the ideology of many 
third world nationalist elites.  There was labor legislation, the regulation of urban areas through 
landlord/tenant, sanitary and zoning regimes, the regulation of financial markets, and the 
development of new institutions of international law.  Just as with CLT=s will theory, the abstract 
idea of the social appealed to a very wide range of legitimating rhetorics.  These traversed the 
left/right spectrum, leaving out only Marxist collectivism at one extreme and pure 
Manchesterism at the other.  Thus the social could be based on socialist or social democratic 
ideology (perhaps Durkheimian), on the social Christianity of Protestant sects, on neo-Kantian 
Asituational natural law,@ on Comtean positivism, on Catholic natural law as enunciated in Rerum 
Novarum and Quadrigessimo Anno, on Bismark/Disraeli social conservatism, or on early fascist 
7ideology.   
Regardless of which it was, the slogans included organicism, purpose, function, 
reproduction, welfare, instrumentalism (law is a means to an end)Band so anti- deduction, because 
a legal rule is just a means to accomplishment of social purposes.  A crucial part of their critique 
of classical legal thought was their claim that it maintained an appearance of objectivity in legal 
interpretation only through the abuse of deduction.  Many advocates of the social argued that 
various groups within the emerging interdependent society, including, for example, merchant 
communities and labor unions, were developing new norms to fit the new Asocial needs.@  These 
norms, regarded as Avalid@Aliving law@ (Ehrlich), rather than deduction from individualist 
postulates, should, and also would, in this Alegal pluralist@ view, be the basis for legislative, 
administrative and judicial elaboration of new rules of state law.
While the social was spectactularly successful as a legislative reform program, the social 
as a mode of legal thought underwent the same kind of brutal discrediting that had befallen CLT. 
 We will take up the reasons for this, and Weber=s role in it, below.
Part II. Weber=s sociology of law
The best way to understand the chapter on AThe Sociology of Law@ in Economy and 
Society3 is as an analysis of CLT, presented as Ajust the way we do things now,@ combined with 
an historical narrative of how CLT came into existence, and a critique of the critique then being 
leveled against it by the social current.  This same sociology of law was an important element in 
8the construction of Weber=s broader sociology of domination in modern capitalist society, but 
this aspect of the story is reserved for Part III.  
A. Weber=s methodology vs. the methodology of the social current
Weber was substantively in sympathy with a large part of the social legislative reform 
program.4  But, although he never, as far as I know, stated it explicitly, his methodology is well 
understood as a root and branch attack on and an alternative to that of the social people. First, 
Weber is famous for his insistence on a sharp distinction between the sociological is and the 
ethical or political ought.  From AThe Meaning of >Ethical Neutrality= in Sociology and 
Economics,@5 and AObjectivity in Social Science and Social Policy@6 through to AScience as a 
Vocation,@7 Weber argued that the very maneuver that defined the socialBthat is, the claim that it 
was possible to go from an analysis of the modern social mode of interdependence, a fact, to the 
progressive reform agenda, an ought, couldn=t be done.  But this is only the beginning of his 
divergences from the method of the socially oriented critics of CLT.
Weber is also famous for his opposition to Aemanationism,@ that is, to the idea that 
transpersonal entities like Ageist@ or Ahumanity@ can figure plausibly in historical or sociological 
explanation.  This is his explicit critique of hegelianism and of the German historical school.8
He applied it fully to law.9  But Turner and Factor have persuasively argued that, in the 
development of the sociological categories of action and domination we will present in the next 
subsection, Weber was systematically and carefully reworking the superficially similar 
categorical scheme of Rudolf von Jhering, the German founder of the social approach.  The point 
of the reworking was to purge any suggestion that there are Asocial purposes@ or a telos to social 
9development, or an evolutionary logic that can simultaneously explain and justify legal change.  
In this respect, Weber was diametrically opposite to Tonneis, to Durkheim, and also to 
Talcott Parsons, for each of whom an organicist or functionalist understanding of society allows 
us to make, if not Aobjective value judgments,@ at least judgments about what to do that are the 
farthest thing imaginable from mere ideological preferences.  For Weber, social change is a 
resultant of the play of social forces.  These include ideals and values as well as diverse material 
and institutional interests, always in conflict and subject to massive applications of the law of 
unintended effects.  For the socially oriented critics of CLT, on the other hand, there is, at the 
very least, a logic of social development that law can either facilitate or obstruct.
Finally, it is familiar that Weber was at once an appropriator of10 and a strong critic of 
Marxist approaches to economic history.  What he most strongly criticized was the mono-causal 
approach of the Abase/superstructure@ distinction, in which legal categories reflect the mode of 
production and legal rules serve the interests of the ruling class.11 This kind of criticism applies 
mutatis mutandis to the social approach, for which law reflects society, albeit sometimes with 
tragic lags, and ought to serve a depoliticized and universal interest in social development.  For 
Weber, law is, as we might now put it, Arelatively autonomous,@ and also Aconstitutive,@ rather 
than merely reflective.
B. The basic categories of Weber=s general and legal sociologies
This section briefly lays out the basic ideal typical categories Weber used in constructing 
his sociology of law.  Weber=s categories for general sociological and for legal analysis  are the 
basis for the categories of his sociology of domination as well.
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1. General sociological categories
Weber usefully distinguishes between action that is purpose-rational and action that is 
value-rational.
A[Social conduct] may be determined rationally and oriented toward an end.  In 
that case it is determined by the expectation that objects in the world outside or 
other human beings will behave in a certain way, and by the use of such 
expectations as conditions of, or as means toward, the achievement of the actor=s 
own, rationally desired and considered aims.  This will be called purpose-rational 
conduct.
Or, social conduct may be determined, second, by the conscious faith in the 
absolute worth of the conduct as such, independent of any aim, and measured by 
some such standard as ethics, aesthetics, or religion.  This case will be called 
value-rational conduct.@ 12
Contrary to what readers sometimes think, purpose rationality is clearly Ahigher@ than 
value rationality, for Weber, as the order of presentation in Economy and Society shows, and as is 
confirmed by his discussion of the ethics of acts vs. the ethic of consequences in Politics as a 
Vocation.  It is important that purpose rationality is oriented to accomplishing either a single goal 
in the most effective way, or some combination of goals through a balancing of costs and 
benefits, in each case based on calculating how the situation in which one acts will be modified 
for good and ill by one=s action.  
Value rationality  means that the actor has identified a rule that applies to the situation 
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and proceeds to obey that rule, experienced as internally binding, based on some mode of 
legitimation that might be religious, ideological, philosophical, ethical or whatever.  The key to 
the conduct is that the actor obeys without considering the consequences.  Once authoritatively 
established, the rule is the rule, and obedience is the only consideration.  Action in obedience, 
say, to one of the Ten Commandments, or to one=s conviction that Athe right to control your body 
is absolute@ is value rational.  
The purest type of value-rational validity is represented by natural law.  The 
influence of its logically deduced propositions upon actual conduct may lag far 
behind their theoretical claims; that they have had some influence cannot be 
denied, however. Its propositions must be distinguished from those of revealed, of 
enacted, and of traditional law.13
2. The legal mode of authority (legitimate domination)
 This is Weber=s typology of the modes of legitimate domination:
The actors can ascribe legitimate validity to an order in a variety of ways:
The order can be recognized as legitimate, first, by virtue of tradition: valid is that 
which has always been.
Second, the order may be treated as legitimate by virtue of affectual, especially 
emotional, faith; this situation occurs especially in the case of the newly revealed 
or the exemplary.  
Third, the order may be treated as legitimate by virtue of value-rational faith: valid 
is that which has been deduced as absolutely demanded.
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Fourth, legitimacy can be ascribed to an order by virtue of positive enactment of 
recognized legality.  Such legality can be recognized as legitimate either (a) 
because the enactment has been agreed upon by all those who are concerned; or 
(b) by virtue of imposition by a domination of human beings over human beings 
which is treated as legitimate and meets with acquiescence.14
Orders based on tradition, affect and value-rationality can be reenforced by enacted law.  
Also, there are other types of law than enacted law, including especially revealed law and natural 
law.  The mode of legitimate domination through enacted law makes a sharp distinction between 
Alawmaking@ and Alawfinding.@
According to our contemporary modes of legal thought, the activities of political 
organizations fall, as regards Alaw,@ into two categories, viz., lawmaking and 
lawfinding, the latter involving Aexecution@ as a technical matter.  Today we 
understand by lawmaking the establishment of general norms which in the 
lawyer=s thought assume the character of rational rules of law.  Lawfinding, as we 
understand it, is the Aapplication@ of such established norms and the legal 
propositions deduced therefrom by legal thinking, to concrete Afacts@ which are 
Asubsumed@ under these norms.  However, this mode of thought has by no means 
been common to all periods of history.  The distinction between lawmaking as 
creation of general norms and lawfinding as application of these norms to 
particular cases does not exist where adjudication is Aadministration@ in the sense 
of free decision from case to case.15
In a modern system, law making is open ended: A any given legal norm may be 
13
established by agreement or by imposition, on grounds of expediency or value-rationality or both, 
with a claim to obedience at least on the part of the members of the organization.@16 Once the 
lawmakers have established the system of legal norms, the modern legal mode of authority 
(legitimate domination) is defined by the further requirement that lawfinding must be 
Aimpersonal@: 
[E]very single bearer of powers of command is legitimated by that system of 
rational norms, and his power is legitimate in so far as it corresponds with the 
norms.  Obedience is thus given to the norms rather than to the person [17].
Again, there is nothing natural or automatic about this conception.  It is also possible for 
lawfinding, like lawmaking power to be Apersonal:@
Such personal authority can, in turn, be founded upon the sacredness of tradition, 
i.e., of that which is customary and has always been so and prescribes the 
obedience to some particular person.
Or, personal authority can have its source in the very opposite, viz., the surrender 
to the extraordinary, the belief in charisma, i.e., actual revelation or grace resting
in such a person as a savior, prophet, or a hero.18
But in such a case we are not dealing with the ideal type of legal authority.  
3. The modes of modern legal thought
The different modes of modern legal thought are ideal typical descriptions of  what is
done by the specialists in lawfinding (as opposed to lawmaking) when it comes to deciding how 
to apply enacted law to concrete cases.  These can be judges, but they can also be bureaucratic 
14
administrators, or professors critiquing judges, or professors deciding hypothetical cases.   
Among systems that have gotten beyond supernatural methods (oracles, trial by ordeal), 
and also beyond ad hoc decision, Weber distinguishes modes of legal thought according to how 
close they are to his unequivocally most rational mode, which he calls Alogically formal 
rationality@ (LFR):
Present-day legal science, at least in those forms which have achieved the highest 
measure of methodological and logical rationality, i.e., those which have been 
produced through the legal science of the Pandectists= Civil Law, proceeds from 
the following five postulates: viz., first, that every concrete legal decision be the 
Aapplication@ of an abstract legal proposition to a concrete Afact situation@: second, 
that it must be possible in every concrete case to derive the decision from abstract 
legal propositions by means of legal logic: third, that the law must actually or 
virtually constitute a Agapless@ system of legal propositions, or must, at least be 
treated as if it were such a gapless system; fourth, that whatever cannot be 
Aconstrued@ legally in rational terms is also legally irrelevant: and; fifth, that every 
social action of human beings must always be visualized as either an Aapplication@
or Aexecution@ of legal propositions, or as an Ainfringement@ thereof. 19
An aspect of logically formal legal rationality (LFR) that Weber reiterated over and over, 
but that isn=t found in this definition, is that the lawfinder doing LFR is restricted to the Alogical 
analysis of meaning@ performed on a corpus of validly enacted norms that come from the 
lawmaking institution, whatever it may be.  LFR Ais found where the legally relevant 
characteristics of the facts are disclosed through the logical analysis of meaning and where, 
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accordingly definitely fixed legal concepts in the form of highly abstract rules are formulated and 
applied.@ 20
LFR is most definitely not necessary in order for the mode of authority to be ideal 
typically legal.  All that is needed is that the mode of lawfinding be sufficiently Aformal,@ i.e., 
rule-bound, so that lawfindng is plausibly impersonal.   For example, there are types of formal 
legal rationality that are not Alogical,@ including particularly the English common law.21  Formal 
rationality in general, whether of the higher Alogical analysis of meaning type@ (i.e., LFR), or the 
more primitive British precedential type, contrasts sharply with the very important Weberian 
category of Asubstantive rationality@ as a mode of legal thought.   
A[S]ubstantive rationality@ ... means that the decision of legal problems is 
influenced by norms different from those obtained through logical generalization 
of abstract interpretations of meaning.  The norms to which substantive rationality 
accords predominance include ethical imperatives, utilitarian and other 
expediential rules, political maxims, all of which diverge from the formalism ... 
which uses logical abstraction.22
In LFR, when the lawfinder acts, by deciding the case or making his academic 
interpretation of what the law Ais,@ his action is always Avalue rational= in Weber=s usage. On the 
basis of the logical analysis of the meaning of the extant valid norms, he chooses a norm, without 
regard to the social consequences of his choice, and then applies it to the facts at hand, again 
without regard to the social consequences.  This contrasts sharply with substantively rational 
legal thought.  There, the judge may be, contrary to what some commentators suggest, acting in a 
value rational way (say, by applying religious commandments such as Athou shalt not kill@ or 
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absolute natural rights such as Arespect private property@).  But the legal actor is also 
substantively rational if what he does is to identify a set of societal goals, or a set of partial 
political objectives of the ruler, and then craft his rule to maximize their accomplishment through 
a situation-sensitive balancing test.  
In other words, substantive legal rationality can be either value rational or purpose 
rational (whereas LFR is always value rational).23  The point about substantive rationality is not 
its mode of orientation to action, but the extra-juristic or Aexternal@ derivation of the criteria of 
decision, that is, their derivation from the general normative practices of society.  Weber=s 
emphasis on this distinction is analogous to the preoccupation in contemporary legal theory with 
the question of the Aautonomy@ or Arelative autonomy@ of legal reasoning and legal institutions, 
and with the problematics of legal Aautopoiesis.@ 24
4. The three types of inquiry into legal rules
Starting from his three critiques of the social approach (no is-to-ought, no supra-
individual social telos, Arelative autonomy@ of law), and working from the categorical scheme 
laid out above, Weber sharply distinguished three types of questions that the socially oriented 
critics habitually blurred.  
(a) Legal validity: a juristic inquiry
In a system that is Amodern@ or of Atoday,@ we can ask what, according to legal dogmatics 
is the valid legal rule for the legal scientist or the judge interested in deciding how an open legal 
question or a particular dispute about given facts should be resolved. This is a question of the 
meaning of the existing norm systemBbut only because that is the historically current mode of 
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legal thought, namely LFR.  This question has a completely different meaning, or no meaning at 
all, in other systems and in other periods.  While the question of what mode of legal thought will 
be applied is sociological, the question of the Aright answer@ within the mode is not.  It is a 
question answered through the application of juristic technique.25
Judgments of validity in modern Alegal science@ are (i) not judgments about a matter of 
fact, but correct or incorrect interpretations of the logical requirements of the meanings of the 
system of norms.  (ii) They are not ethical judgments, because the logical coherence and 
gaplessness of the system of norms provides no warrant whatever of the moral desirability or 
moral (as opposed to legal) validity of the norm system as a whole or of any particular norm.  
(iii) They are Ascientific@ judgments because validity is established according to interpretive 
procedures strictly bound by logic.26
(b) Sociological validity: a factual inquiry
(i) what are the norms that actually exist in a society?  A factual question, requiring 
first an elaborate differentiation of types of normative systemBall seen as subsets of Aregularity.@
For example, habit, custom, convention, law, state law.  It includes both the question of the 
substance of the norms (e.g., are usurious contracts binding?) and the question of the mode of 
legal thought.27
(ii) what causes a particular norm system to come into existence?   Like the first 
sociological question, we can ask it about both the substance of the norm system and about the 
mode of legal thought.  This is the main topic of Weber=s historical sociology of law, discussed 
in the next subsection.
(iii) how does a normative order of the legal type (adminstered by a specialized 
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staffBfor example, of lawfinders) achieve Alegitimacy,@ meaning a probability of obedience 
higher than what can explained by the material threat of legal sanctions?  This is the question of 
where legal norms get intrinsic Aoughtness,@ in the minds of addressees.  It has nothing to do 
with our own view of the goodness or badness, rightness or wrongness of the norm in question.   
As we have seen above, legal norms can be legitimated by tradition, by charisma (e.g,, by 
revelation), or Alegally,@ that is, by the mere fact of proper enactment.  
(iv) what is the impact on the behavior of social actors of  factually existing systems of 
law, in the sense of norms backed by sanctions of various kinds administered by specialized 
staffs and possessing legitimacy?  This is a factual question that requires us to look at what 
actually influences the practical, particularly the economic behavior of whatever actors we are 
concerned with.  For example, we can ask what norms governed usury in different systems, how 
effectively they were enforced or evaded, and what the impact of the actual or attempted 
prohibition of usury was on economic development.  We can ask the same kind of question about 
modes of legal thought, for example we can ask about the influence of the rationalization of law 
on the emergence of bureaucracy, or about its influence, through its supposedly superior 
calculability, on economic development.28
(c) Ethical/political judgment: the ethical irrationality of the world
On what should Awe@ base legal rules when we are choosing consciously among them? 
For Weber, this is an ethical/political value judgment, and one that we confront in our particular 
historical circumstance of disenchantment, a process that has affected all the different systems to 
which we might appeal to ground ethical/political choice by deducing answers from normative 
postulates or factual regularities, including particularly religion, rationalist natural law, and social 
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science.  Weber has a lot to say about this, not as a sociologist but as an ethicist in a particular 
tradition, and we=ll take it up later because it is highly relevant to the contemporary mode of legal 
thought.
C.  Weber=s historical sociology of Western legal thought ca. 1900
Using the above complex categorical scheme, Weber=s sociology of law is an historical 
account of how the Western European great powers came to have, first, the set of legal concepts 
that they presently have, second, the set of substantive legal rules through which they regulate 
economic life, and, third, the mode of legal thought through which these rules are administered.  
His methodology, like that of this Chapter with respect to our contemporary mode of legal 
thought, is Agenealogical.@29
1. The origins of present legal categories and legal norms, i.e., of CLT
He starts with the present, in which his contemporaries understand law to be divided into 
public and private, rights-granting and administrative, criminal and private, tort and crime, and so 
forth.  Moreover, his contemporaries understand LFR to be Athe@ modern mode of legal thought.  
Next he takes up the substantive content of a modern system of private law, which consists of 
what we call property and contract, commercial law, and corporate law.  The system is based on 
the idea that there is freedom of contract unless the state limits it, which it often does, for a wide 
variety of reasons, along with a family law system that rejects contractualizaton and 
commodification of sexual relations through a status conception of marriage, and corporate law 
regimes that permit economic entities to function legally as self-contained units.  
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In each case, he shows that the familiar concepts and specific rules of our modern system 
have a complex legal history, in which the specific economic interests of powerful groups, the 
agendas of political rulers, and, over and over again, the specifically technical or academic 
interests of legal specialists drive legal change on the way to the current set-up.  Just before 
beginning this summary history, he sums up his conclusion in a famous paragraph:
As we have already pointed out, the mode in which the current basic conceptions 
of the various fields of law have been differentiated from each other has depended 
largely upon factors of legal technique and of political organization.  Economic 
factors can therefore be said to have played their part but only to this extent: that 
certain rationalizations of economic behavior, based upon such phenomena as a 
market economy or freedom of contract, and the resulting awareness of the 
underlying and increasingly complex conflicts of interests to be resolved by legal 
machinery, have influenced the systematization of the law or have intensified the 
institutionalization of political society. ... On the other hand, we shall frequently 
see that those aspects of law which are conditioned by political factors and by the 
internal structure of legal thought have exercised a strong influence on economic 
organization.30
The odd phrase Acertain rationalizations of economic behavior@ seems to me to mean the 
development of modern capitalist enterprise with great economic power; the Aresulting 
awareness@ is that law has a large effect on such matters as the distribution of income; and this 
leads to the development of state institutions designed to control or channel market forces 
according to the political aims of governments.  However, in his actual historical account, Weber 
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often attributes particular legal changes to the needs either of particular interest groups or to the 
needs of a developing economy.  The above paragraph exaggerates his opposition to the Marxist 
approach.
2. The development of lawmaking 
Having accounted for the emergence of the specific categories and characteristic rules of 
a modern legal system (in a manner that is not particularly original or interesting to today=s 
readers, I dare allege), Weber undertakes a fascinating and difficult history of legality.  It 
combines throughout the development of his Auniversal sociology@ (ideal typical categories, with 
hypothetical connections among them, for understanding all law in all places throughout history), 
and his Aphilosophy of history@ (his grand narrative of rationalization and disenchantment).31
The universal sociology roams freely around the world, from system to system, showing 
that such phenomena as oracles, divine revelation, law prophecy, folk assemblies, cadi justice, 
priestly rationalization of divine law, substantively rational patrimonial administration, and so 
on, are common to many systems and work in quite similar ways from system to system.32
The philosophy of history dimension is about how the West of the European Continent, 
and only the West of the European Continent, arrived (a) at the sharp separation of law making 
and lawfinding, (b) at the view that lawmaking is a secular process through which a state 
claiming the monopoly of the legitimate exercise of force enacts valid legal norms as 
compromises of conflicting interests (legal positivism) and (c) at the practice of elaboration and 
application of the norms (lawfinding) through LFR, that is through the logical elaboration of the 
meaning of the norm system taken as a whole, excluding all elements of substantive rationality 
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(not to speak of irrational elements of various kinds).  In other words, it turns out that the 
categorical schemes we presented above simply as a typology, were all designed to set up a 
particular historical narrative progression ending in the Continental present of 1900.
The parts of this Euro-exceptionalist narrative that are most important for our purposes 
are the latest in time.  The peculiar conditions that facilitate the emergence of the notion that law 
is made by the sovereign and can be elaborated according to LFR include, in merely 
chronological order, the peculiarities of Roman law; the peculiarities of canon law administered 
by the Papal bureaucracy; the development of academic law specialists in universities rather than 
in a powerful guild of legal practitioners; the peculiarities of the revival of Roman law in the late 
Middle Ages; the need of the 17th and 18th century enlightened despots to consolidate power 
against feudalism by alliance with the bourgeoisie combined with the development of state 
bureaucracies; the emergence of what Weber calls Arevolutionary natural law@ (the Rights of 
Man, particularly to property and freedom of contract, as the only legitimate source of positive 
law) in the 18th century (not to be confused with Catholic natural law); and the creation of the 
first modern code by the French in 1803. 
3. Revolutionary Natural Law (the Rights of Man)
We need to pause at Weber=s interpretation of the Rights of Man.  In the chapter of 
Economy and Society on the Sociology of Law, Weber introduces revolutionary natural law as a 
key element in the emergence of the modern conception of law making (we hold positive law to 
the test of natural rights) and of LFR.  A[T]he natural law axioms of legal rationalism .. alone 
were able to create norms of a formal type ... @33 Specifically, what happened was the elaboration 
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of the abstract principles of revolutionary natural law, and the fragmentary, not yet Asublimated@
provisions of the French Civil Code, into the pyramidally structured, deductive, complete system 
that I called above Athe will theory.@
AThe purest type of [formal natural law] is that ... which arose in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries as a result of the already mentioned influences. especially in the form of the 
>contract theory= and more particularly the individualistic aspects of that theory.@  He goes on the 
elaborate, and mock, the derivation of the rules of a laissez faire economy from the 
individualistic conception.  Here Weber simply appropriates the work of the social oriented 
critics of Classical Legal Thought (Jhering, Gierke and Ehrlich).  The construct of an 
individualistic will theory used to deductively elaborate a complete system was their work and 
not his.
Revolutionary natural law clearly produces Avalue rational@ orientations to action in the 
form of rules that are to be observed regardless of the consequences (though it  adds elements of 
substantive rationality in the form of reasonableness tests the minute jurists begin to elaborate it 
into a normative system34).  But how does this type of law fit into Weber=s typology of 
legitimacy?  His most basic model of legal development is that tradition is disrupted by 
charismatic revelation of new norms that are then rationalized (this is one aspect of the famous 
Aroutinization of charisma@) by the specialized staffs that administer them.  Charismatic 
revelation is at first strictly associated with the divine (oracles; revelationBas in Moses and 
Mohammed).  
Religion plays a role here, too, since Weber follows his friend Jellinek in locating the 
sources of the Rights of Man in Athe religious motivation provided by the rationalistic 
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[Protestant] sects ...@ 35  But natural law is not itself religious.  In fact, A[i]t is the specific and 
only consistent type of legitimacy of a legal order which can remain once religious revelation and 
the authoritarian sacredness of a tradition and its bearers have lost their force.@36
We have to go elsewhere in Economy and Society, to the discussion of ASect, Church and 
Democracy,@ for an explanation.  The belief in the Rights of Man is the:
charismatic glorification of >Reason,= which found a characteristic expression in 
its apotheosis in Robespierre, [and] is the last form that charisma has adopted in 
its fateful historical course.  It is clear that these postulates of formal equality and 
economic mobility paved the way for the destruction of all patrimonial and feudal 
law in favor of abstract norms and hence indirectly of bureaucratization.  It is also 
clear that they facilitated the expansion of capitalism.  The basic Rights of Man 
made it possible for the capitalist to use things and men freely, just as this-worldly 
asceticismBadopted with the same dogmatic variationsBand the specific discipline 
of the sects bred the capitalist spirit and the rational Aprofessional@ who was 
needed by capitalism.37
4. Natural law disintegrates into legal positivism
Natural law, and the individualistic will theory developed from it, disintegrated, 
according to Weber, during the second half of the nineteenth century.  The reasons are the 
following: First, the rise of socialist substantive natural law theories proclaiming Athe right to 
work,@ Athe right to a minimum standard of living,@ Athe right to the full product of one=s labor,@
and more.  Second, Anatural law doctrine was destroyed by the evolutionary dogmatism of 
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Marxism, while from the side of >official= learning it was annihilated partly by the Comtean 
evolutionary scheme and partly by the historicist theories of organic growth.@38 In other words, 
Classical Legal Thought, as the will theory, was destroyed by its two enemies, namely Marxist 
theory and the socially oriented reform theory (the latter was Aofficial@ only in Bismarck=s 
Germany).  Weber sums up his diagnosis in a famous passage:
Compared with firm beliefs in the positive religiously revealed character of a legal 
norm or in the inviolable sacredness of an age old tradition, even the most 
convincing norms arrived at by abstraction [from natural law axioms] seem to be 
too subtle to serve as the bases of a legal system. Consequently, legal positivism 
has, at least for the time being, advanced irresistibly.  The disappearance of the 
old natural law conceptions has destroyed all possibility of providing the law with 
a metaphysical dignity by virtue of its immanent qualities.  In the great majority of 
its most important provisions, it has been unmasked all too visibly, indeed, as the 
technical means of a compromise between conflicting interests.39
5. Weber=s sociology of law incompatible with the socially oriented view of CLT
There are two further striking traits of Weber=s historical sociology law that we need to 
note, just because they distinguish his attitude from that of the social critics.
(a) Historicizing the substantive content of CLT
Whereas each of the schools mentioned above (historical school, utilitarians, Kant or 
Locke natural rights people, social Darwinists) had believed that we got to the will theory 
through the development of an idea, he showed that the free contract/property regime was best 
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understood as an historical accident, with many diverse causes, and many of the causes were 
Adisreputable.@  This idea was incompatible with the critique developed by the social people 
because their theory made CLT a highly adequate adaptation to past conditions favorable to 
individualism (the yeoman theory in the US; the early modern post-feudal situation in Europe).  
(b) The Freedom/Coercion Flip
The various schools who agreed on the will theory, and that it was the working out of an 
idea, also agreed that the idea that got worked out was freedom, or at least autonomy.  Weber 
argued that far from the realization of the will or of freedom, the modern order of freedom of 
contract and property was a regime of coercion.40
Although the social people had themselves extensively developed the notion that unequal 
bargaining power rendered formal equality practically meaningless, Weber=s stark approach was 
incompatible with the social approach for two reasons: It presented the choice as between modes 
of coercion, with different distributive outcomes and different consequences for economic 
growth, period.   For the social, the idea of adaptation to the functions, purposes, or needs of 
Asociety@ provided an objective basis for good law (from is to ought), law that would correctly 
adjust the needs of the individual to the needs of the collective, so a tragic choice between 
coercions was the last thing they had in mind.  Their rhetoric emphasized that their opponents 
were social scientifically vieu jeu, rather than that they were invested in a mode of domination.
D. Weber=s Ambivalent Attitude Toward Logically Formal Legal Rationality:
1. The social critique of LFR: the abuse of deduction
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The social critique of CLT was that it failed to develop the rules needed for the new game 
of interdependence, for two reasons.  The first was its ideological commitment to individualism, 
an outdated philosophy both as description and as norm.  Second, according to the social people, 
CLT people understood themselves to operate as interpreters (judges, administrators, law 
professors) according to a system of induction and deduction premised on the coherence, or 
internal logical consistency, of the system of enacted legal norms.  One mode was to locate the 
applicable enacted rule; a second was to develop a rule to fill a gap by a chain of deductions from 
a more abstract enacted rule or principle; a third, the method of Aconstructions,@ was to determine 
what unenacted principle must be part of Athe system,@ given the various enacted elements in it, if 
we were to regard it as internally coherent, and then derive a gap filling rule from the 
construction.
It is important to recognize that, like his model of the will theory, Weber=s ideal type of 
LFR, which he treats as the Ahighest@ type of legal rationality, is in every way identical to the 
ideal type developed by the social people, here Jhering, Ehrlich and especially Geny, to describe 
CLT.  LFR, as a descriptive category, is theirs not his.  The difference between him and them 
was in their respective attitudes toward this mode understood as highly typical of actual late 19th
century practice.
In the social analysis, because interpreters must always be logically compelled in one of 
these ways, they could never legitimately work consciously to adapt the law to the new 
conditions of the late 19th century.  Nonetheless those conditions constantly presented them, as 
interpreters with gaps.  What the CLT people had to do, to stay loyal to their role as they 
conceived it, was to Aabuse deduction.@  They had to make decisions reached on other grounds 
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look like the operation of deductive work premised on the coherence of the system.  And the 
abuse of deduction permitted the smuggling in not of the general desiderata of social evolution, 
but of the partisan ideologies of the parties to the conflicts between labor and capital, large and 
small business, of the century=s end.
In response, the social people had four positive proposals: (a) from the social Ais@ to the 
adaptive ought for law, (b) from the deductive to the instrumental approach to the formulation of 
norms, (c) not only by the legislature but also by legal scientists and judges and administrative 
agencies openly acknowledging gaps in the formally valid order, (d) anchored in the normative 
practices (Aliving law@) that groups intermediate between the state and the individual were 
continuously developing in response to the needs of the new interdependent social formation.  
We know already that Weber had no use for the first point.  We now take up his critique of the 
remaining three.
2. Weber=s pros and cons of LFR
Weber=s attitude toward  LFR as characteristic of CLT was highly ambivalent.  He was 
aware of the social critique of CLT for the abuse of deduction, and he was careful always to treat 
logically formal rationality as an ideal type never fully achieved in practice and maybe even 
theoretically unachievable.  It has its origin, like the substance of modern law, in historical 
accidents rather than any cunning of history.  But the source of his ambivalence had nothing to 
do with the kind of internal critique of abuse of deduction that the social people leveled against 
it. Quite the contrary.
(a) The cons of LFR
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LFR was a factor in producing universal bureaucratization of social life, and bureaucracy 
was equally characteristic of the state apparatus, private capitalist business enterprises, charitable 
organizations and churches.  Bureaucracy would have to be the characteristic mode of 
organization of a socialist state and society (state ownership of the means of production would 
require an increase rather than a decrease in bureaucracy).  Moreover, it was bureaucracy rather 
than either the state or the capitalist market in the abstract that most substantially restrained 
individual freedom and agency in the modern world.  The basic political/social problem of 
modernity was therefore not the choice between capitalism and socialism but the choice between 
ever increasing bureaucratization and whatever alternative might be found.  
Together with the argument that the contract/property regime was one mode of coercion 
among others rather than the realization of human freedom, the argument for universal 
bureaucratization as the essence of modernity amounted to a radical rejection of the 
public/private distinction, as it had developed, first, in liberal and then, in dialectical opposition 
to the liberal formulae, in socialist thought.  The choice was neither between private freedom and 
public servitude (the liberal version) nor between capitalist servitude and freedom through the 
collective (the socialist version).
Note just how different this mode of critique is from the abuse of deduction idea.  Here it 
is the determinacy, the calculability of LFR that is the problem, rather than the reverse. 
(b) The pros of LFR
But, on the other hand: LFR is Ahow we do it now,@ it is what we mean by Adogmatic 
legal analysis@ or Alegal science,@ and it would be silly to deny that it exists and is a force in the 
world.  It has many of the good attributes that make bureaucracy, both public and private, the 
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most efficient form of administration, by comparison with which the alternatives are mere 
dilettantism.  In particular, it has an important role in guaranteeing that bureaucracy is calculable 
and can proceed sine ira ac studio.  
It is associated as well with accomplishments of the liberal revolutions, in the way of 
formal equality, democracy and due process that, we cannot deny, have transformed our world 
for the better.    LFR, because it operates by the logical analysis of meaning and then the 
deductive application of norm to facts, guarantees the Aimpersonality@ of legal administration.  
That is, it guarantees that only the legislator, who has Athe right to make law,@ makes it in fact.  
Many of the same results can be and indeed have been achieved by the lower form of 
formal rationality represented by the common law.  Weber, moreover, concedes that while 
calculability is crucial to capitalism, LFR is notBindeed, capitalism flourished first under the 
common law, and when the systems compete, the common law tends to win out.  But the reasons 
for this are no credit to the Anglo-Saxons.  It is the highly biased irrationality of their system 
(e.g., the Khadi justice of justices of the peace to represss the rural masses), that largely explains 
their success.  The common law may have worked, but there is no aspect of it that Weber sees as 
on the same level of development as Continental LFR.41
Closer to home, both the substantive rationality of welfarism (i.e., Enlightened 
Despotism), and natural law, whether elaborated deductively from individualist premises or as a 
socially oriented substantive doctrine, have proved failures at the task of providing operative 
techniques for the development of a legal order adapted to the needs of the  administration of 
justice in a centralized bureaucratic state. That was the whole point of his narrative of the 
displacement of natural law by positivism.42  LFR was, in this view, a big advance, but, more 
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important, it was all that was left of the ambitions of legal rationalism as a general phenomenon.
3. Weber=s dismissal of Athe antiformal tendencies of modern law@
The Aantiformal tendencies of modern law@ are, according to Weber, multiple.  They 
include the tendency of formal law to adopt subjective rather than objective tests of intention, 
and subjective ethical notions like Agood faith,@ in response to the need of the business 
community for legal standards that will correspond to the needs of business practice.   Other 
pressures in the same direction included:
the demand for substantive justice by certain social class interests and ideologies; 
... the tendencies inherent in certain forms of political authority of either 
authoritarian or democratic character concerning the ends of law which are 
respectively appropriate to them [i.e., democracy appeases the masses anti-
formally, and authoritarianism keeps power anti-formally]; and also the demand 
of the >laity= for a system of justice which would be intelligible to them; finally, ... 
anti-formal tendencies are being promoted by the ideologically rooted power 
aspirations of the legal profession itself.43
This set of demands, Weber concedes, responds to the fact that Athe development of the 
formal qualities of the law certainly shows some peculiarly antinomian traits,@44, and has 
produced a body of Amodern sociological and philosophical analyses, many of which are of a 
high scholarly value.@ But all of them fly in the face of modern reality.45 Weber understood 
himself to be addressing a complex of positions and attitudes, including Ademands for a >social 
law= to be based upon such emotionally colored ethical postulates as justice or human dignity,@46
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and the Aschool of >free law,=@ which tried to show that there would be gaps in every statutory 
scheme, Ain view of the irrationality of the facts of life; that, in countless instances the 
application of the statute >as interpreted= is a delusion, and that the decision is and ought to be 
made in the light of concrete evaluations rather than in accordance with formal norms.@47
In the same direction were theories, here presumably speaking of Ehrlich, according to 
which the Atrue foundation of the law is entirely >sociological,=@ meaning that judges should 
respond to Anorms which are factually valid in the course of everyday life and independently of 
their reaffirmation or declaration in legal procedure.@48 Even further in the same vein, some 
scholars (Ehrlich again?), first, Adegrade@ statutory enactment to a Amere >symptom=@ of 
sociological validity, and then argue that Ano precedent should be regarded as binding beyond its 
concrete facts,@ to reach the conclusion that the judge should engage in Afree balancing of values 
in every case.@49
In response to these theories, neo-Kantians (Stammler?), Comteans (Duguit?) and 
Catholic natural lawyers propose rational reconstructions that will Areestablish an objective 
standard of values.@ [id.] Putting them together, the set of anti-formal tendencies Aare agreed only 
in their rejection of the once universally accepted and until recently prevalent petitio principii of 
the consistency and >gaplessness= of the legal order.@ 50
Weber=s response remains puzzling.  As he lays out the positions, he repeatedly points out 
that what is proposed is a reversion to substantive justice, is a Achallenge to legal formalism@51, 
and, here is the key charge, that the reformers, Ain view of the inevitability of value-
compromises, very often [would] have to forget about abstract norms and, at least in cases of 
conflict, would have to admit concrete evaluations, i.e., not only nonformal but irrational 
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lawfinding.@52 Weber here uses the word Airrational,@ according to his categorical scheme, to refer 
to decision that is oriented to the facts of the particular case rather than to rule application.  In 
context, this means that because of ideological conflict on the one hand, and the vagueness of 
notions like social justice, on the other, the judge will have to decide each case on its facts.  The 
general program that he attributes to the anti-formal thinkers fits well with this conclusion, since 
Weber sees them, as noted above, as committed to freeing the judge up for the Abalancing of 
values in every case.@  At the least, Athe juristic precision of judicial opinions will be seriously 
impaired if sociological, economic, or ethical argument were to take the place of legal 
concepts.@53
Although he did not present it in this section, Weber had a sharp critique of the notion 
that the Aliving law@ developed by intermediary groups, in the mode of Gierke and Ehrlich, 
should be regarded as having ethical warrant or a claim to being responsive to social needs, just 
because of its Aorganic@ origin.  Although he is happy to Acategorically deny that >law= exists only 
where legal coercion is guaranteed by the political authority,@54 there is never the slightest 
suggestion that customary law is in any way more adaptive or otherwise valuable than state law. 
The Ainterests@ that drive social development are always those of individuals or competing social 
groups, and never those of Asociety.@55 He teasingly points out that, given the way Continental 
judges are recruited and trained, Ait is by no means certain that those classes which are negatively 
privileged today, especially the working class, may safely expect from an informal administration 
of justice those results which are claimed for it by the ideology of the jurists [i.e., the social 
people].@56
Instead of developing this kind of critique, Weber repeatedly notes that the socially 
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oriented reformers represent the desire of the legal profession to avoid the status degradation 
associated with the rationalization of a once learned and autonomous occupation.57.  And then, 
after elaborately summarizing the arguments, he ends abruptly:  AAt this place we cannot 
undertake a detailed discussion or a full criticism of these tendencies, which, as our brief sketch 
has shown, have produced quite contradictory answers.@58 True to his word, he does not make a 
serious effort to come to grips with the socially oriented critique of LFR except to reiterate the 
charge of irrationalism, and add an interesting analogy to religion.  (Remember that proposals for 
ad hoc judicial decision or the balancing of values from case to case fall under Weber=s definition 
of methodological irrationality.) 
All variants of the developments which have led to the rejection of that purely 
logical systematization of the law as it had been developed by Pandectist learning, 
including even the irrational variants, are in their turn products of a self-defeating 
scientific rationalization of legal thought as well as of its relentless self-criticism.  
To the extent that they do not themselves have a rationalistic character, they are a 
flight into the irrational and as such a consequence of the increasing 
rationalization of legal technique.  In that respect they are parallel to the 
irrationalization of religion.59
In the last paragraph of his Sociology of Law, he has this to say to all the tendencies that 
want to openly acknowledge judicial discretion and infuse lawfinding with self-conscious 
concern for substantive justice: AInevitably the notion must expand that the law is a rational 
technical apparatus, which is continually transformable in the light of expediential considerations 
and devoid of all sacredness of content.@ [60]  
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III. Logically Formal Rationality in Weber=s Sociology of Domination
Weber=s attitude toward the social abuse-of-deduction critique of LFR seems strange in 
light of the developments in legal theory over the last century.   Weber=s treatment of its 
inventors seems in retrospect dismissive at best and often tendentious or obtuse.  He failed to 
distinguish the critique of the abuse of deduction from the various kinds of, at that point, 
embryonic alternatives being bruited about, and particularly insisted on associating the anti-
formal critique with cadi justice.  To put it bluntly, since he wrote, the socially oriented critique 
of LFR has won close to universal acceptance, even though the solution of case by case 
adjudication has been equally universally rejected.  In modern legal theory, the single most 
important question is what to do after the demise of LFR, and this is a question Weber resolutely 
refused to face.
In this section, I offer an explanation for Weber=s stance, based on the place of LFR in 
Weber=s sociology of domination in modern society.  We have seen already that, in this 
sociology, the modern system of property and contract law, bureaucratically administered, 
structuring a market economy also bureacratically administered, constitutes a pervasively 
coercive social order, rather than either the realization of human freedom or an invitation to 
socialist reform.  I will argue that in order for this position to make sense, Weber had to defend 
LFR against the social critique.
A. Religion, rationalization, disenchantment, mysticism: The Iron Cage Narrative
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In Weber=s general sociology, the domains are religion, science, politics, the economy, 
sexuality and art.61 There are complex analogies in the evolution of the domains, established 
through a basic conceptual vocabulary that includes the concepts of disenchantment, 
rationalization, bureaucratization, irrationalization, and sectarianism.  It is striking that in his 
Aphilosphy of history@ writings, Weber does not, as far as I know, ever offer an analysis of the 
legal domain that establishes the analogies with these other ones.  This in spite of the fact that he 
wrote an enormous amount about law, and characterized law in ways that are full of parallels 
with the others, including the importance of specialists and specialized knowledge, 
bureaucratization, and, above all, rationalization.  In fact, Weber treats the development of LFR 
as of prime importance both to politics and to economics.  
The rise of the modern bureaucratic state is intimately intertwined with LFR, and LFR 
makes that state a calculable element in the economy.   At the same time, the administration of 
large corporations comes to ressemble more and more closely the administration of the state 
apparatus.  But law is just as intimately important to the evolution of religion and science.  The 
rationalization of religion is partly a matter of the development of the first bureaucracy by the 
Catholic Church, and a large part of that bureaucracy=s function was the rational development 
and application of canon law.   The modern university, which is the producer of modern science, 
is a state institution with an internally bureaucratic organization as well.  There is the same 
double relevance of law: organized religions develop religious law, and do it bureaucratically; 
universities develop scientific laws, and do it bureaucratically.  
The metanarrative: Initially, all the domains, and those of sex and art as well, are bound 
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together in religion.  Religious thought struggles for a rational answer to the question of 
theodicyBor of the apparent ethical irrationality of the world (the good suffer, the evil are 
rewarded).  The attempt to find a rational answer sets us down a path of Adisenchantment@ as it 
turns out to be possible to explain more and more of what happens in the world without positing, 
first, miracles, and then, the existence of God.  This is the work of science.  Disenchantment is an 
existential or phenomenological category.  It means loss of belief that humans arrive at birth in a 
material and social world where events are part of a system of ethical meaning (one that includes 
supernatural powers) that we have Amerely@ to discover.
The knowledge of the world as a place of cause and effect goes along with the gradual 
development of the science of norms, that is of how to use legal technique to organize people in 
the state and the economy.  What is disenchanted here is, first, divinely revealed laws of social 
organization, and, second, the divine right of kings and other authorities (all the way down the 
great chain of being to the level of, say, the manor) to issue legitimate commands.  Together with 
scientific disenchantment, political disenchantment allows a vast increase of power over the 
material world, so long as we use the power for secular ends.  This is rationalization.  Its highest 
accomplishment is bureacratization in state and economy.  
But religion doesn=t go away.  It struggles against science and against legal 
disenchantment to affirm cosmic meaning accessible to reason, but it also retains and develops 
Airrational@ tendencies, meaning mysticism.  It is more and more forced to concede that the world 
works without direct divine intervention and that reason cannot find the world=s ethical meaning 
simply by rational interpretation of what we know about it.  But it insists more and more strongly 
that there are other truths, ways of knowing, and experiences than those that are made intelligible 
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through the techniques of disenchanted knowing, or mastered for secular ends through 
rationalization and bureaucracy.  
The organizational correlate of religion=s surrender of science and the state to secular 
forces is religious sectarianism.  The process of polarization, so to speak, in which religious 
meanings are more and more to be found by the individual seeker Abeyond@ the domains of 
secular activity undermines, though only slowly, the aspiration to theocratic rule, or even to the 
religious organization of society through Aestablishment.@  The end result is the transition from 
Achurch@ to Asect,@ which is a voluntary community of believers existing in the private sphere of 
civil society without public powers and functioning within the state=s regime of civil law.  (This 
strongly ressembles Marx=s Essay on the Jewish Question.)
When Weber describes the antiformalism of the social people as a disparate set of  
irrational reactions to the rationalization of legal science, it is to this version of religious 
development that he refers.  It is not a flattering allusion.  He clearly regards disenchantment not 
just as inevitable but as a process whose Atruth for us@ only Agrown up babies,@ as he puts it, can 
deny.  He recognizes the fact of mystical otherworldly experience, but doesn=t see it as even a 
little challenge to disenchantment and rationalisation within actual social practices.  Antiformal 
reactions within the actual social practice of law are destined to well deserved defeat if all we can 
say for them is that they are the analogue to the flight into mysticism and sectarianism in religion. 
In this version of the metanarrative, all the emphasis is on the power of the autonomous 
Alogics@ of state and economy, their imperviousness to transformation through religion, and the 
foolishness of resisting the benefits that come along with acceptance of rationalization.  Of 
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course, the situation has the downside that the autonomous logics are logics of domination, and 
that a disenchanted world has a basic grimness because of our nostalgia for lost meaning, even if 
we have the refuge of manly embrace of the partial ethic of our particular calling within one of 
the domains. 
Our modernity is further redeemed, to however limited an extent, by the existence of two 
other domains, love/eroticism and art, which split from religion through a process closely linked 
to disenchantment in economy and polity.  With the decline of public religious power, they are 
capable of holding their own and even developing their autonomy as concrete social practices 
against the perennial hostility of religion.  Eroticism and art for art=s sake are self-consciously 
irrational, and self-consciously resistant, as yet, to modern-style social control.   Nonetheless, 
they are in the shadow of rationalization and bureaucratization (sexual science, Foucaldian 
institutions of sexual discipline; art theory, art markets, museums).   We might add (Weber 
doesn=t) that they develop their own intense sectarianism, in the form of the warring art 
movements and sexual ideologies.
B. The Disenchantment of Lawmaking and the Scientificity of LFR
1. The disenchantment of lawmaking (not of LFR) fits the metanarrative
The coherence of this picture of modernity is promoted by a version of the history of 
modes of legal thought that emphasizes the progressive disappearance of value rational sources 
for the legitimacy of legal/bureaucratic domination.  As we have seen in Part II above, Weber 
offers just such a narrative.  Ultimate norms are first legitimated by tradition, with change 
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brought about by charismatic revelation claiming a divine origin.  Charismatic revelation is 
routinized in theocratic regimes into religious law, of a more or less formally rational character.  
Then, as we=ve seen, there is the last gasp of charisma in the form of revolutionary natural law 
(the Rights of Man) quickly routinized into a deductive legal science, and equally quickly 
discredited by positivist critique of its fanciful state of nature myths, vagueness, and internal  
inconsistencies.  Another important factor is the rise of the variants of the social ideology,  
splitting the charismatic camp and reducing its plausibility as pure reason.
All the while, logically formal rationality and state bureaucracy are emerging 
downstream, so to speak, from the battles at the abstract level of God vs. Reason, just as rational 
economic practices develop in the shadow of medieval and early modern monarchical absolutist 
controversies about how to secure the welfare of the populace.  Theories of natural law are in fact 
the last representatives not just of charismatic law giving but also of pre-modern enchantment as 
a general phenomenon.  In the words of Colliot-Thelene:
 The structure that determines the recent evolution of natural law doctrines 
(l=Enthullung, or Aunveiling@[of legal norms as merely compromises of conflicting 
interests]) is closely related to that of disenchantment: the veil is lifted on the 
reality of law, as the charm is removed that had more generally hidden from prior 
generations the prosaic character of the here-below.  In the brief span of a century, 
or rather of a few decades, the concept of law repeated, on a smaller scale, the 
very process of desacralization and elimination of transcendence that at a general 
level engenders modernity.  The Aformalist@ definition of the legal mode of 
domination recognizes this twice over reduction, within which the second in time 
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[Aunveiling@ of law as mere compromise] brings the first [general disenchantment] 
to a close at the same time that it reproduces it.  If natural law was the only form 
of legitimacy that remained after the disappearance of belief in religious 
revelations or the sacredness of tradition, formal legal rationality was in turn all 
that remained of the legitimacy of the Rational State once the values on which that 
legality had originally rested had lost their persuasive power.62
2. Weber=s commitment to the scientificity of LFR explained as necessary in order for 
modernity to be an Iron Cage
It is at least plausible, it seems to me, that Weber=s dismissal of the antiformal social as 
irrational had one of its origins in the role of LFR in his theory of modernity as I=ve just sketched 
it.  Weber is committed to the tragic situation of loss of meaning within a system of domination 
by the autonomous logics of the spheresBthis is the famous AIron Cage@ of modernity--redeemed 
only by the possibility of stoic pursuit of a vocation and the private pursuit of the erotic and the 
aesthetic. 
The Ascientificity@ of LFR is essential here because it is the glue that holds the 
rational/bureaucratic structure of domination together after disenchantment has deprived it of all 
external traditional or charismatic legitimations.  The following seems to me a key to Weber=s 
whole sociology, and it is pretty brilliant besides, and so worthy of quotation at length:
Present-day economic life rests on opportunities acquired through contracts.  It is 
true, the private interests in the obligations of contact, and the common interest of 
all property holders in the mutual protection of property are still considerable, and 
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individuals are still markedly influenced by convention and custom even today.  
Yet, the influence of these factors has declined due to the disintegration of 
tradition, i.e., of the tradition-determined relationships as well as of the belief in 
their sacredness.  Furthermore, class interests have come to diverge more sharply 
from one another then ever before.  The tempo of modern business 
communication requires a promptly and predictably functioning legal system, i.e., 
one which is guaranteed by the strongest coercive power.  Finally, modern 
economic life by its very nature has destroyed those other associations which used 
to be the bearers of law and thus of legal guaranties.  This has been the result of 
the development of the market.  The universal predominance of the market 
consociation requires on the one hand a legal system the functioning of which is 
calculable in accordance with rational rules.  On the other hand, the constant 
expansion of the market, which we shall get to know as an inherent tendency of 
the market consociation, has favored the monopolization and regulation of all 
Alegitimate@ coercive power by one universalist coercive institution through the 
disintegration of all particularist status-determined and other coercive structures 
which have been resting mainly on economic monopolies.63
Given the effacement of traditional and charismatic authority, as well as of the non-state 
institutions that once guaranteed order, we couldn=t speak of a rationalized, bureaucratized set of 
domains constituting an iron cage of particular logics if we didn=t believe that LFR could 
function, at least in a gross way, to put the dominant order into effect at the level of application.  
And the moral picture of tragic loss of meaning would no longer be plausible if within the key 
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domain of legal practice there was the possibility of redemption by the reintroduction, anti-
formally, of substantive ethical elements.  If that were the case, all bureaucrats would have the 
possibility of agency within their jobs, rather than being condemned to vocational formalism.64
IV. The Disenchantment of  Logically Formal Rationality
Here begins a second Weberian narrative, in which his sociology works strongly against 
his own interpretation of modernity in general, and against his defense of LFR in particular.  
A. Rehabilitating the irrational moment within rationalized domains
1. The irrational moment in economy, science and politics
In the last narrative, religion retreated into mysticism, confronted by the overwhelming 
theoretical success and practical power of rationalization in science, state and economy.  But 
there is another Weberian narrative running parallel to this one.  In science, state and economy, 
under conditions of bureaucratization, there remains an irreducible irrational element to the 
activity within each domain.  In the Iron Cage discussion, the logics of the domains are both 
unitary and irresistible, but in conflict with one another.  In this second narrative the logics of the 
domains produce, over and over again, situations of undecidability.  
Because this point is more familiar for state and science than for the economy (Politics as 
a Vocation and Science as a Vocation), we can begin with the economy.  The most developed 
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modern bureaucratic economic systems run partly on the charismatic irrational principle 
represented by entrepreneurship as risk taking, by the management of monopolies, and 
specifically by Robber Baronage.  Weber=s  Robber Barons are individuals who manage to 
operate outside the constraining logic of competitive price determination, taking advantage of 
opportunities that are objectively present but also capitalizing on their own charismatic qualities.
In science, it turns out that Acreativity@ isn=t reducible to bureaucratically determinable 
characteristics that govern the specialized subdomains of the modern university.  It involves an 
agonistic, irrational, intuitive moment without which no amount of learning and technique can 
accomplish anything of note.  In politics, there is a similar split: the state is reduced more and 
more to a bureaucracy administering a rule system according to LFR, but the politicians are 
engaged in Afighting@ for power, and have to make decisions with big ethical implications using 
an ethical apparatus that is internally contradictory and so often leaves them just having to 
Adecide.@  This is the much commented on ASchmittian@ element in Weber=s thought,65 shared
with other post-Nietzschean modes, such as existentialism.65
At this point in the analysis, science, economic management and politics have more in 
common with love/eroticism and art than at first appeared.  Each is a domain split internally 
between a bureaucratic element operating according to LFR and an irrational but equally 
essential element within which LFR doesn=t operate, and neither do more mundane techniques 
for rationally deciding what to do.  
The problem is not just that each domain has a logic and the logics (or Gods, in Weber=s 
terminology) are at war.66  The situation is much more dramatic, because within the part of each 
domain where LFR doesn=t operate, there are irreducibly conflicting principles at work, rather 
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than a single logic.  Loyalty to one=s vocation turns out not to be an answer to the disintegration 
of the world into antagonistic value-spheres, because antagonism is present within each sphere. 
This is where sectarianism comes in.  Just as religious irrationalism favors religious
sectarianism, the irreducibly irrational in politics favors ideological sectarianism and nationalism. 
 In the economy, it favors national economic rivalry even against the Alogic of the market.@  Only 
in science, in Weber=s view, does the power of the rational grid confine irrationalism to the 
moment of individual creativity (what would Thomas Kuhn say about that?).  
Let me hasten to say that the reading I=ve just proposed is at least as partial as the 
previous one, in which science, state and economy starkly oppose religion, sex and art.  It is 
moreover an Aideal typical@ rendering of disenchantment as a general phenomenon, and I=ve 
embellished Weber=s account to give it an internal consistency that will be useful, I hope, in the 
analysis of the fate of LFR in the contemporary mode of legal thought.
Remember that the puzzle before us is to understand Weber=s theory of LFR, and to trace 
the fate of his theory into the contemporary mode of legal thought.  As a first step, we have 
already distinguished the question of  moral or ethical validity of norms in a system from the 
question of the mode of legal reasoning once a set of norms are given legislatively.  LFR is, in 
Weber=s view, the modern way to do legal interpretation to generate new legal norms 
scientifically from the legislative postulates.  Keeping to his distinction, the ideal typical 
narrative of disenchantment applies without much strain to Weber=s account of the enterprise of 
producing valid legal norms by declaration (as opposed to by interpretation, as in LFR).  His 
sociology of law elaborates the series of steps that lead us to the modern situation he calls 
positivism and that we call classical legal thought:
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Law
Disenchantment law disengaged from 
religion (oracles, 
divine revelation)
Rationalization legislative codification 
+ logically formal 
legal rationality
Bureaucratization specialized, unitary 
national legal system
Irrationalization natural rights theory 
(charismatization of 
reason) 
Sectarianism proliferation of natural 
rights theories (e.g. 
social vs. individual)  
2. The disenchantment of lawmaking merges it into the political domain
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In the above, what is disenchanted is lawmaking understood as such.   Weber=s theory of 
the disenchantment of lawmaking ended with its fusion into politicsBspecifically legislative 
politics.  In other words, once legitimations for lawmaking had reached the point where multiple 
natural rights theories, Marxism, and the variants of the social ideology contended to define the 
necessary ethical substance of the legal order, and none of them were plausibly rationally 
compelled (they were merely rival charismatic claims), lawmaking was just a branch of politics.  
This meant that the law making process was subject to the logic of the political sphereBit was 
about Afighting@ between interest groups and ideological sects.  Politicians made their decisions 
about what law to create in the same situation of ethical undecidability (due to contradictory 
moral imperatives) that applied to all other political questions.
When Weber spoke of the Aanti-formal tendencies of modern law@ he was not referring to 
the proliferation of schools of thought about what to legislate or declare constitutionally, or about 
the merger of lawmaking and politics.  These had been the topics of the previous sections.  They 
had established for the legal domain the same internal structureBprogressive rationalization and 
bureaucratization in one sector of the domain, combined with irrationalization and sectarianism 
in anotherBthat existed for religion, politics, economy, sex and art.  
AThe Anti-Formal Tendencies of Modern Law@ is rather about an irrationalist assault on 
the supposedly hard rational kernel of LFR that remains within the legal domain at the level of 
interpretation after law-declaration has been politicized.  This kernel is important not just to the 
legal domain, but through its role in the general social form of bureaucracy, to all the other 
domains that have undergone the modern form of rationalization.
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B. The implausibility of LFR after the politicization of lawmaking
There seems on the face of it to be a serious, indeed invalidatingly serious problem with 
Weber=s attitude toward LFR.  It is implausible that lawmaking, whether by charismatic divine 
revelation, natural law deductions or positivist enactment, can lose enchanting power, while LFR 
grows and even becomes stronger all the while.  The problem can be stated simply: 
1. Because there are contradictory legislative ideals, we can no longer Apresuppose@ the 
coherence of Athe system@
As we=ve seen already, according to Weber, Western legal thought moved from natural 
law to positivism for two reasons.  First,  the vagueness, inconsistency, etc., of natural law makes 
it inapt as a basis for a modern legal bureaucratic order.  Second, the development of new types 
of charismatic natural law thinking, and the variants of the social ideology.  These developments 
undermine both the charismatic and the rational claims of the 18th century Arevolutionary@ natural 
law of the bourgeoisie, that is, the Aindividualist@ natural law of absolute property rights and 
freedom of contract.
Positivism becomes the theory of lawmaking because natural law is implausible in theory, 
but also because actual legislation comes more and more to embody both the program of 
revolutionary natural law and that of social law.  The corpus of codified rules thus no longer 
plausibly translates a single set of value-rational judgments (say, the rights of man) into the 
details of legislation.  Rather, in Weber=s formula already quoted, law Ahas been unmasked all too 
visibly, indeed, as the technical means of a compromise between conflicting interests.@67
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This development put LFR in jeopardy.  There are two components to the modern legal 
order, codification and the technique of interpreting the code Aas though it were@ an internally 
consistent document each of whose concrete or (in the European phrase) Amaterial@ provisions 
can be understood to be an implication of the meaning of a more abstract provision.  In this 
system, as I explained above, gaps are filled by the analysis of the system, presupposed to be 
internally coherent, to build a chain downward from some unquestionably valid abstract 
provision, or upward to and then downward from some logically required though unenacted 
abstract provision.  
So in LFR, the statement that the system is Apresumed to be gapless@ has a particular 
meaning.  It does not mean that the code, or the body of legislatively enacted statutes, contains a 
provision that can be directly applied to every case that comes before the judges.  Quite the 
contrary, LFR presupposes that the judge (or professor) will often find, in the body of 
legislatively enacted rules, no particular rule that applies to the particular facts of his case.  But 
the system is indeed gapless in the sense that by the logical analysis of meaning the judge or 
professor can derive deductively a rule that will be the correct one to apply.  This, again, involves 
both finding enacted abstractions from which to derive the subrule and also Aconstructing@ new 
abstractions where they are logically necessary, given the premise of the coherence of the whole 
code.
The jeopardy created by the recognition of the vagueness of revolutionary natural law 
combined with the rise of rival forms of natural law was that the method of LFR might no longer 
be plausible.  Why not?  If there are rival abstract principles of natural law, representing say the 
bourgeois property/contract version and the socialist, labor-based version, and each approach has 
50
been embodied in legislation, the presumption of internal coherence is false in fact.
This is jeopardy but not yet actual disaster (that is, disenchantment), for the following 
reason.  Weber=s modern mode combined LFR with the elaborate Amaterialization@ of law by the 
legislative adoption of ever more detailed statutory and administrative norms covering more and 
more particular cases.  This meant that there was a kind of race going on, in which the plausible 
determinacy of the legal order was shored up (by the multiplication of specific enacted norms) at 
the same time that the plausibility of rational interpretation of the norms was undermined (by the 
multiplication of flatly incompatible abstract principles each with a claim to explain a large part 
of the concrete multitude of enactments).
Already at the time Weber wrote, it seemed obvious to many legal theorists that this race 
would end in the utter discrediting of LFR.  These are the very theorists he criticizes in the AThe 
Anti-Formal Tendencies of Modern Law.@  His dismissive characterization of their position I=ve 
already mentioned.  But they had good reasons for arguing that LFR was an implausible 
description of the way legal reasoning worked.  Moreover,  their experience of the 
disenchantment of LFR, that is, of its loss of all persuasive power, seems in retrospect a highly 
plausible consequence, in Weber=s own terms, of the dynamic of rationalization.  Weber was 
wrong to see them as irrational in the mode of the religious flight into mysticism.  He should 
have recognized that what was happening was exactly the same movement toward decisionism, 
this time within the process of legal interpretation, that he had brilliantly traced for the process of 
formal law declaration, on the model of economy, science and politics. 
2. Gaps were inevitable, the stakes were high, many valid norms were the product of 
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the abuse of deduction
The implausibility of LFR derived, in large part, from two Adiscoveries@ (by which word I 
mean to endorse them):  First, the dynamism of the capitalist economy generated, constantly, 
increasingly, legal gaps or conflicts involving large economic and political stakes.  Second, a 
large part of the body of norms that applied to economic and political life was judge made 
according to LFR, but had involved in its formulation the Aabuse of deduction.@
 While these norms were supposedly derived by the Alogical interpretation of meaning@
from other norms legitimated by enactment, the derivations were flawed.  Because the 
derivations were flawed, they were open to the charge that they were illegitimate in their 
resolution of the high stakes issues involved.  Worse, they might well represent not random 
errors in deduction, but Amotivated errors@ of an ideological kind.  The judges were open to the 
charge that they had settled these high stakes questions according, as Holmes put it in 1897, to 
their Aeconomic sympathies.@68
To the extent this diagnosis was accurate, the modern judge (or the modern law professor 
in systems where professors were understood to have the main task of legal interpretation) 
confronted a dilemma that Weber never took seriously.  The judge was likely to have to decide, 
as the economy and polity rapidly changed shape, on the choice of a valid legal rule.  Even if the 
choice seemed to occur at a low level of the system, and therefore not to have major systemic 
implications, it might have very large economic or political implications (think of modern 
decisions about intellectual property, or Bush v. Gore).  The massive body of enacted norms is, 
ex hypothesis, no help.  It can=t just be Aapplied@ Bor there would be no Agap.@
The enacted or Aconstructed@ principles from which the concrete norms supposedly derive 
52
are contradictory.  They embody, for example, radically different attitudes toward freedom of 
contract according to whether they come from the Arevolutionary@ or the Asocial@ version of 
natural law.  Moreover, many of the concrete rules that might seem most relevant were chosen 
through judicial or Ascientific@ (by professors) Alogical interpretations of meaning@ that now 
appear open to the charge that they were abuses of deduction with patent ideological motivations. 
 What=s a boy or girl to do under these circumstances?
Contrary to what political philosophers and newspaper editorial writers are likely to think, 
the one option that is not open is to claim that we must stick to LFR in order to Aguarantee 
certainty@ for reasons of economic functionality, or to Aguarantee respect for the separation of 
powers@ between judge and legislator for reasons of democratic political legitimacy.  The reason 
for this is that it is LFR itself that has presented us with the choice in question.  LFR has proved 
internally indeterminate.  We can=t just Astick to LFR@ (maybe arguing Awhat are the 
alternatives?@).  With respect to the particular high stakes problem that the judge is asked to 
decide by choosing among alternative candidate valid rules, there is no LFR to Astick to.@
Denying this, and proceeding merrily along in full Afidelity to law,@ or some other such nonsense, 
is exactly what we mean by the abuse of deduction.
A jurist who has reached this point can be said to have experienced the disenchantment of 
LFR in a quite specific Weberian sense.  From Savigny=s brilliant first volume of The System of 
Modern Roman Law69 until the 1930's, jurists in Europe were, as has often been noted, obsessed 
with the idea that the ensemble of valid legal norms constituted a system in the strong sense of an 
entity whose internal coherence could be presupposed.70  Given that presupposition, it is 
plausible to say that Athe system determines@ the choice of a rule among alternative candidates 
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when there is an apparent gap at the level of materially applicable rules.  
The Asystem@ is a Ametaphysical@ entity because it is the product of, but somehow 
transcends, a multiplicity of concrete decisions by particular adjudicators, the work of a wide 
range of jurists, and the enactments of legislators, including the personally clueless legislators of 
massive codifications.  When we say that Athe system determined@ the choice of a particular 
materialized rule to resolve a high stakes dispute, we mean that an entity transcending the above 
mentioned individual social actors determined the choice.  
The critique of LFR disenchants it because it deprives the decision maker of the illusion 
(for us, it is no longer any more than an illusion) that Athe system@ in some sense produces the 
norms that decide cases, rather than either some particular earlier jurist enunciating some 
particular rule, or we ourselves imposing meaning in the presence of a gap (one we may 
ourselves have worked hard to open), in the post-Nietzschean mode.  Sometimes there appears 
before us some earlier jurist=s valid norm, and we can=t resist the experience of being bound to 
apply it.  Sometimes, and sometimes as a result of our conscious effort, a space appears in which 
we can impose meaning.  To be disenchanted is to Abracket@ the question of what immanences 
and transcendences (i.e., what conception of Athe system@) might once have rendered this 
experience of subjective boundness and freedom intelligible.71
There are two radically different ways to proceed after acknowledging the bind.  The first 
is the Weberian way, though he refused to take his own way with respect to the issue before us, 
that of the disenchantment of LFR.  The Weberian way is to acknowledge disenchantment and 
take responsibility, in the antinomian decisionist mode, for making a choice without hoping that 
it will have a Awarrant.@  The other way, the one pursued by legal theory over the whole course of 
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the last century, is the way of Areconstruction,@ that is, of the attempt to re-legitimate legal 
interpretation according to new ideal types, after the disenchantment of LFR.
Part V: The Contemporary Mode of Legal Thought: Policy Analysis
I would distinguish two historically important reconstruction projects, one for private, 
administrative and substantive criminal law, and the other for constitutional law, with very 
different content, different origins, and different fate.  In constitutional law, today, the dominant 
model is based in a very straightforward way on Unitedstatesean constitutional history and 
practice, as reinterpreted to some extent by Jellinek and Kelsen.  A legitimate order is based on 
plebecitary adoption of a written constitution containing a charter or declaration of rights, which 
judges of a constitutional court are to interpret according to extant juristic technique, with the 
constitutionally granted power to overrule democratically enacted legislation and executive 
action, although without direct access to police or military staffs to enforce their judgments 
against legislature or executive.
It is an interesting question how this ideal type has gained legitimacy around the world, 
but it is to my mind less interesting than the one to which I have chosen to devote the remainder 
of this paper.  That is the question of reconstruction in private law, administrative law, and 
substantive criminal law, a project that was initially a joint venture of German and French 
scholars, with the rest of the world looking on, but became, in the 1930's and 1940's, above all a 
Unitedstatesean venture, globalized after the second World War.
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A. Weber accepted and rejected within the contemporary mode of legal thought
In  Europe through Kelsen72 and in the US through Llewellyn and the legal realists,73
Weber=s basic critiques of the social B that it illegitimately attempted to generate a legislative 
ought from the is of social change, and that it often (not always) tried to bootstrap validity in the 
juristic sense from the facts of regularity of behavior and normative consensusB were very fully 
assimilated and are an important part of the modern mode of legal thought (in its theory part).  
Moreover, Weber=s basic sociological distinctions are the basis of the methodology of modern 
legal sociology on both continents.
It is very different with respect to Weber=s overall diagnosis of legality and its future.  In 
Europe the traumas of the middle third of the twentieth century led to revival of natural law, in a 
context in which it continued its confrontation with legal positivism a la Kelsen.  Legal 
formalism, though discredited at the level of pure theory, survived and even prospered as part of 
the mystique of the civil as against the common law and as part of the liberal post WWII 
argument that the anti-formalism of the social current was complexly complicit in the rise of 
fascism and even in Stalinism. (In spite of the intense Marxist critique of the socialByou have to 
be a Hayekian libertarian to believe that the social people are crypto-communists). 
What happened in the U.S. was no more Weberian, but very different from what 
happened in Europe.  The critique of LFR had been taken seriously and far in the U.S. during the 
period between 1900 and 1930.  The American critics of Classical Legal Thought used all the 
European materials, but they were co-inventors of the strategy and actually did it  more 
thoroughly than the Europeans. (Compare, for example, Hohfeld with Josserand.)  Moreover, 
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their version was never even slightly enamored of judicial discretion, as was the case briefly in 
France and Germany.
There was an initial period, that of the heyday of legal realism, when the critique of the abuse 
of deduction combined with insistence on a sharp is/ought distinction led to two opposite, quite 
extreme reactions.  On one side was a scientific positivist approach aiming to identify the factual 
regularities of legal behavior, rigorously excluding all reference to the dogmatic materials, influenced 
by behaviorism in psychology and the Vienna Circle.  On the other side was an intuitionist account 
of judicial behavior in applying law to facts, typified by a famous article called AThe Function of the 
>Hunch= in Judicial Decision.@74  These tendencies were denounced by the American founders of 
sociological jurisprudence (Pound) and also by the emigres from Hitler=s Germany who had recanted 
their Free Law wildness (Kantorowicz, Kocourek).75
This phase was quickly succeeded by the rise of what I have been calling the contemporary 
mode of legal thought.  There was  intense development of the Aabuse of deduction@ strand in the 
social critique of CLT, decisively discrediting LFR for the legal profession as a whole, in a way that 
never happened in Europe, and incorporating what Weber called Arelentless self-criticism@ into the 
professional training of elite lawyers.  A second key trait was the Ajuridification@of Asubstantively 
rational@ normative elementsBi.e., legal Apolicies@-- that for Weber were inconsistent with the highly 
developed form of LFR. 
 The best way to understand the Unitedstatesean development would be this: the U.S. post-
social scholars accepted and even greatly intensified the abuse of deduction critique, but recognized 
Weber=s (and others=) critique of the social as threatening diffuse judicial usurpation and 
incalculability.  The danger was particularly obvious in the U.S., where progressive forces had 
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struggled for several generations against conservative judge-made constitutional law restrictive of the 
very reforms advocated by the social people.  Both the rise of policy and the development of human 
rights judicial review were post-realist responses to these challenges.  This means that Weber=s 
sociology of law was not propheticBnot LFR but a distinctively hybrid contemporary mode of legal 
thought legitimates contemporary legal/bureaucratic domination. 
B. AFormalizing@ substantive rationality: the rise of policy analysis
In the contemporary mode of legal thought, legal interpretation is based on a combination of 
deductive argument in the mode of LFR, precedential argument, and what is called Apolicy 
argument.@  Policy argument is sufficiently different from the Atraditional@ modern modes so that it 
warrants, I think, an attempt to present it in the form of a new ideal type, rather than as a combination 
of the modes of legal reasoning typologized by Weber.  Weber=s typological axes can nonetheless be 
helpful in this.  It is worth noting that Max Rheinstein, in his Introduction and footnotes to AMax 
Weber on Law in Economy and Society,@ repeatedly recognizes that Unitedstatesean legal theorists 
(among whom he includes himself) think they have gone beyond LFR to a method they call policy 
analysis, and are therefore likely to disagree with Weber=s characterization of the modern mode of 
legal thought.76
1. Ideal typical legal policy analysis
Policy analysis presupposes that the interpreter has to decide in the presence of a gap in the 
system of valid norms, or that he has to apply a norm that in its own terms calls for policy analysis, 
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or that the circumstances for some reason permit application of a norm derived from policy analysis 
to displace a deductively derived norm.  The analysis presupposes that there are many policies, or 
desiderata in rule making, that they often though not always conflict, that they are well 
conceptualized as forces or weights or vectors in a force field, and that they vary in force or weight 
according to the precise factual circumstances to which they are applied within the field.  Policies 
come in conflicting pairs of different types, including conflicting welfare arguments, conflicting 
moral maxims and conflicting subjective rights.  There are also as we will see an important class of 
Ainstitutional@ policies.
Rational decision is defined in policy analysis as choosing a norm to apply to this case and to 
a class of similar others in the future on the basis of a total-value-maximizing balance of the 
conflicting policies.  It is understood, first, that the rule is no more than a compromise of the policies, 
rather than a thing valid in and of itself, and, second, that the rule will inevitably be more or less 
adequate across the range of fact situations to which it applies.  The ideal type as a whole was the 
work of Jhering, Holmes, Heck, Demogue, Radbruch, modern Unitedstatesean conflict of laws 
theorists, and the sequence of Hohfeld, W.W. Cook, Llewellyn, Felix Cohen, John Gardner, Lon 
Fuller, Hnery Hart & Albert Sacks, and Stewart Macaulay.77  Macaulay, interestingly, uses Weber=s 
sociological categories in constructing his catalogue of interests to be balanced.78
2. Policy analysis as Aformalized substantive rationality@
Weberian substantive legal rationality is rational in the sense that it appeals only to rationally 
calculable factors (no oracles or trial by battle).  It may also be rational in the sense that it decides 
according to a rule (derived from one of the extra-juristic normative orders of the society), or it may 
proceed ad hoc. In the case of policy analysis,  the decision maker has no rule already available that 
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he can just apply, because the attempt to do LFR turns up a gap or a conflict.  But the goal of the 
policy analysis is to choose a new rule that will be applied first to this case, and then in the future 
(except as explained below).  Policy analysis, is therefore not Airrational@ in the sense of refusing to 
decide according to rule. 
Like Weber=s substantive rationality, the content of policy analysis is derived from the 
general political, moral, religious and expediential goals that drive government in the society as a 
whole.  Nonetheless, modern policy analysis is in several important ways closer to LFR than it is to 
Weberian substantive legal rationality.  In contemporary policy analysis, the policies (welfarist, 
moral, rights based) are understood as strictly legal, fully Ainside@ the practice of legal interpretation, 
rather than as external, and in this respect policy analysis resembles LFR.79
Policies are plausibly Ainternal@ because there is an implicit criterion for their Ajuridification,@
namely, universalizability.  (In Habermas=s sense.80) Only policies, or desiderata, that everyone 
shares can be included, in order to preserve the legitimacy claim of the procedure.  So for example 
efficiency considerations can be included but distributive ones cannot; general moral desiderata are 
permissible but not moral teachings uniquely associated with a particular  church or sect (or for that 
matter with atheism as a belief system); the only rights that can be consulted are Auniversal@ at least 
in form.
The self-consciously selective incorporation of substantively rational elements from non-
juristic normative practice goes along with the typification or ritualization of legal policy argument.  
The result is a juristic practice that is sharply distinguishable from the general social normative 
practice from which it derives.  However, the commitment to balancing conflicting policies, with an 
eye to consequences, in a context in which rules represent no more than the means to implement the 
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resulting compromise, sharply distinguishes policy analysis from LFR.  It also distinguishes policy 
analysis from those variants of substantive rationality that are value rational, i.e., oriented to rules 
absolutely valid without regard to consequences.
3. Policy analysis transforms the will theory and the social theory into policies to be 
balanced
One of the most striking developments of the 1940's was the transformation of the Aformalist@
requirements of the will theory, and the equally formal functionalist requirements of the social, into 
mere policies to be balanced within the larger analysis.  The will theory became Lon Fuller=s 
Aprinciple of private autonomy,@ no longer the fountain of deductions, but rather primus inter pares
of a set of principles that included, for example, a potentially conflicting principle of protecting 
reliance.81
In modern tort and contract law doctrinal writing, both in Europe (e.g., Ghestain, Viney, 
Atiyah)  and in the U.S. (e.g., Prosser, Farnsworth, MacNeil) , the principle of private autonomy is 
often opposed, from case to case or across a particular doctrinal domain, with varying results, by 
what is unmistakably the old social principle validating the claims of interdependence.  Policy 
analysis appears to have transcended, in this way, the antinomy of autonomy of the will and social 
embededness.  
It is striking that it does this for each type of policy: economic, moral and rights based.   
When rights conflict, it is likely to be an autonomy right conflicting with a right to protection against 
harm.  The autonomy principle of no liability without fault comes up against the counter-principle of 
Aobjective responsibility@ (liability based on causation).  The efficiency gains from permitting the 
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externalization of costs confront those of internalization of costs. In this way, what seemed to be an 
insuperable objection to normatively compelling rational law making, namely the existence of 
contradictory legal philosophies each claiming to operate according to an absolute (logical or social) 
necessity, was transformed into something like a technical problem (though the need for value 
judgmentsBnot political judgmentsBwasn=t denied). 
4. Policy analysis transforms objections to its legitimacy into additional policies to be 
balanced 
Weber=s ideal type of substantively rational legal thought succumbs, in his theory, to LFR 
because LFR is superior both in that it provides calculability for the addressees of the legal order and 
because it permits a sharp separation between norm formulation and administration, whether the 
formulator is an absolute monarch or a parliament.  At first blush, it might appear that any legitimacy 
claims of policy analysis must be defeated on the ground of incalculability and failure to respect the 
separation of powers. 
The true genius of the policy analysis initiative was that it found a way to meet these 
objections in the mode of confession and avoidance.  Because he operates within a mode of thought 
for which LFR has been disenchanted, gaps and conflicts, some with high stakes are inevitable.  That 
means that Avalue judgments@ are also inevitable.  All that can be hoped for is to make them in the 
most rational way possible, that is, in the way posing the least danger (not no danger at all) of 
incalculability and/or politicization of the adjudicative process.  This is accomplished within the 
contemporary mode of policy analysis by incorporating the question of the calculability of the 
chosen rule, and the question of the appropriate division of law making power between judge and 
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legislature, into the policy calculus itself.
In policy argument, a major question is whether the rule proposed will be adequately 
calculable (in policy jargon, Aadequately administrable@), account taken of the major problem of 
arbitrary over- and under-inclusion that highly calculable rules inevitably generate.  In policy 
argument, a second major question is whether the choice of a rule is consistent with the premise of 
the separation of powers between judge and legislator, of course acknowledging that the inevitability 
of gaps makes this problem insoluble in the old fashioned terms of LFR (Ainstitutional competence 
arguments,@ in policy jargon).82
An adjudicative system whose mode of thought corresponded to the ideal type of policy 
analysis would be Aautopoietic@ (in the very limited sense that Teubner gave to Luhmann=s ideal 
type83) because its practice includes wholly intra-system methods (not rules) for the generation of 
new norms to apply to the data that arrive from Aoutside,@ and also methods (not rules) for regulating 
the boundaries of the legal system vis a vis others, viz. the legislative and executive.  It is for this 
reason that it seems right to call it a Aformal@ (in Weber=s sense) version of substantive rationality.  It 
is also purpose-rational  rather than value rational, because it is based on consequence-oriented 
trading off of values rather than rule application.  But it involves constant value judgments as to what 
policies should be juridified and how to balance them in any particular case of rule-making.
Of course, policy analysis is never present in pure form in contemporary legal thought, and 
always operates in uneasy co-existence with at least the following earlier types: cadi justice or lay 
equity, LFR, the Asocial@ methodology of deducing a rule from a single social purpose, and the mode 
of positivized natural rights reasoning characteristic of modern charter-based constitutionalism with 
judicial review.  Moreover, the Weberian category of legitimacy doesn=t capture the subtle 
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psychological attitudes of modern ruler and ruled toward the ought-claims of law produced in this 
way. I would prefer to describe them in the register of degrees of Abad faith,@ in the Sartrean sense.84
Conclusion: Irrationality in Adjudication and the Sectarianism of 
Contemporary Legal Theory
In contemporary legal theory, policy is always a potential Trojan Horse for ideology, just 
because of the patently weak rationality of choosing policies by universalizability and then merely 
Abalancing@ them.  The Weberian legitimacy of the legal order rests partly on the  claim that Awe@ use 
democratic law making proceduresBrather than judicial legislation--to deal with ideological conflict. 
 It also rests partly on the claim that constitutional law, with non-ideological judicial enforcement, 
guarantees human rights. As a consequence, the apparent possibility of a moment of arational, 
Weberian or Schmittian decision within the adjudicative process is, at least, Aa problem,@ for 
apologists for the existing legal and social order.  
One way to interpret the proliferation, after about 1970, of Aschools@ of legal theory is as a 
Weberian phenomenon of sectarianism in the face of the irreducible ethical irrationality of legal 
judgment.  Thus revived natural law, human rights, law and economics, Habermasian speech act 
theory, Dworkinian rights theory, libertarian legal theory, feminist legal theory, critical race theory, 
and, last but by no means least in this list, critical legal studies, would represent responses to the core 
dilemma, whether it is called Ademocracy deficit,@ Acountermajoritarian difficulty,@ Ajudicial 
paternalism,@ Aresult orientation,@ Aactivism,@ or whatever.  
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It is hard to imagine that Weber would have found any of the reconstruction projects of 
contemporary legal theoretical sects even slightly plausible, as a response to his dire decisionist view 
of political existence.  To a degree that has continually surprised me, this inquiry into Weber=s 
sociology of law, viewed in conjunction with his general sociology of disenchantment, seems to lead 
to the conclusion that much critical legal studies work, in the skeptical vein, has been reinvention, or 
adaptation to new non-Weberian purposes, of Weberian wheels.  
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